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1 Introduction
Common knowledge assumptions have been used in game-theoretical analyses
explicitly or implicitly. Usually the following basic common knowledge is as-
sumed. One is that the structure of a game is common knowledge. The other is
that the fact that all players are Bayesian rational is common knowledge. In a
view of decision-theoretical foundation of noncooperative games, these assump-
tions are essential. It, however, is hard to understand the significance of the as-
sumptions because it is represented by infinite layers of knowledge like, ‘I know
that you know that I know ... and so on ad infinitum. Are there differences of out-
comes of the games between under finite layers of knowledge ?almost common
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Abstract
Rubinstein ?1989?’s paradox comes from the nature of games and
players’ ability of reasoning. We consider alternative assumptions to get
his result. While we discard the assumptions that players know the prob-
ability of nature’s move and the probability of failure of sending e-mail,
bounded rationality of players and players’ attitude to risks are incorpo-
rated in our model. We show that his result is obtained even though each
player cannot operate the mathematical induction. Our model does not
allow players to have richer information than Rubinstein’s original model,
but it is more natural one to describe our reasoning process.
knowledge? of the game and under common knowledge of the game? Rubinstein
?1989? showed that assumptions of common knowledge and almost common
knowledge of a game lead completely to different results, respectively.
In Rubinstein ?1989? he showed that players cannot coordinate efficient
strategies if the game is almost common knowledge, while it is possible when
the game is common knowledge. He called the result “paradox” because it is
counterintuitive when the game is sufficiently known each other ?but it is not
common knowledge?. The discussion assumes implicitly that players can coordi-
nate when the game is common knowledge. In this short paper we reconsider
whether the paradox is really “paradox” by using non equilibrium model and shall
show that the paradox comes from different level of difficulty to coordinate
strategies and also players’ ability to infer the opponents’ knowledge.
As Rubinstein ?1989? mentioned, the mathematical induction might not match
to our intuitive reasoning. I guess that the disagreement occurs due to the differ-
ent points of view of analysts and of players involved in the game. It is natural
that our intuition is formed at realized state of the nature. Each player only
realizes possible states at each state according to his information partition. For
players to conduct the mathematical induction, they have to be third-party’s
position. Thus the fact makes us feel the discrepancy when we compare pre-
scribed behavior of the game with our intuition. We do not use the mathematical
induction to get outcomes of the game. By dropping the mathematical induction,
we know what players would know and decide as their strategies at a realized
state of the nature.
Now assume that in some game there are multiple equilibria, and players try
to compare the equilibria. We use the equilibrium concept just only for players’
reference point. At the beginning of comparing equilibria players should know
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what are equilibria. As Brandenburger and Dekel ?1989? showed, it is not guar-
anteed for players to choose equilibrium strategies under basic common knowl-
edge assumptions without players’ internal consistent beliefs. Thus players
would not know which equilibrium will occurs decision-theoretically under two
basic common knowledge assumptions. I shall present that it is appropriate for
players to consider possible rationalizable strategy combinations to compare
equilibria. I shall measure the difficulty to coordinate strategies according to risk
dominance, that is pair-wise comparison of equilibria.
Notice that the two basic common knowledge assumptions are used to derive
rationalizable strategies. In Rubinstein’s e-mail game common knowledge as-
sumption of the game does not hold at each state of the nature. Then what are
appropriate rationalizable strategies without assumption that the game is com-
mon knowledge? I shall construct solid decision problems under such a situation.
2 The Electronic Mail Game
Consider Rubinstein ?1989?’s e-mail game. According to the nature’s move, a
state is selected with probability and a state with probability , where



. At the state , , a game is played by player 1 and player 2.
The payoffs in the games are as follows.
?????? ??????? ????????
??
A B
A M, M 1, ?L
B ?L, 1 0, 0
state 
Only player 1 knows the true state. If state occurs, 1 sends e-mail to 2 in
order to report the true state. Each player replies to the opponent that he re-
ceived the message. Due to a technical problem, the message fails to reach with
probability . If state occurs, 1 does not send the message.
Both games represent coordination problems. But  is different from  in
the sense that there exists dominant strategies in, but no such strategies exist
in. Thus no wonder that players incannot coordinate their strategies even
when the game is common knowledge because of the difficulty of coordination.
Then can we say that Rubinstein’s result is really “paradox”? Let’s consider the
properties of each game, respectively.
Now assume that player 1 and player 2 will play game , and that this fact is
common knowledge. In addition ?throughout this paper?, we assume that all
players are ?Bayesian? rational, and the fact that all players are ?Bayesian? ra-
tional is common knowledge. Under these assumptions we can consider players’
rationalizable strategies.
Let  , , and
	
		
				
	
where 	is 	’s set of possible actions, 	is player 	’s payoff function and 
	is
player	’s belief over player	’s actions. Then construct	,recursively as
follows.
		 			
	
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A B
A 0, 0 1, ?L
B ?L, 1 M, M
state 
where is a set of probability distributions over a set . Define






Then
 	

Thus only action  is rationalizable strategy for both players in 	.
Next instead assume that
is played, and that this fact is common knowledge.
Then
 		

Both actions and are rationalizable strategies for both players under the as-
sumption that game 
 is common knowledge. In contrast to game 	, players
cannot coordinate their strategies decision-theoretically in the game 
.
Now introduce a communication mechanism via e-mail that forms players’
knowledge. The set of states of the nature , induced by the mechanism is
				

		 


Players’ information partitions are represented by
 					
		
			
		
		
			
		
	
	
						
		
		
			
		
	
	
			
		
	

Notice that both game 	and 
cannot become common knowledge.
When  , 1 considers that and are possible from his infor-
mation partition. Assume that 1 is trying to choose his action by using the
mathematical induction that indicates that 2 will take some action as induction
hypothesis. But the induction hypothesis is based on the fact that 2 concludes to
choose the action according to also the induction hypothesis that 1 will choose
some action at . Notice the state ?that is,
		or

		is impossible state from 1’s point of view at  . Certainly 1
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knows that 2 considers   possible. Does player 1 use the induction hy-
pothesis that is based on 2’s knowledge that comes from impossible state from
1’s point of view?
We assume that people try to justify their actions and beliefs according to ac-
tually realized states from the players’ point of view. It means that players do not
use the mathematical induction to choose their actions.
3 Example
In this section we consider the e-mail game that is different from Rubinstein’s in
the sense that the probability of nature’s move and the probability of failure of
sending e-mails are not known to players. We shall describe players’ conceivable
rational strategies given their knowledge, then how they behave with mind of
risk to take strategies.
Assume a state happened. Then player 1 knows , player 2
knows , 1 knows that 2 knows , but 2 does not know that 1 knows that 2
knows , and 1 does not know that 2 knows that 1 knows that 2 knows .
Under the state of the nature how do players choose their optimal strategies de-
cision-theoretically given their knowledge about the game and their knowledge
of their knowledge of the game and so on? Since 1 knows and knows that 2
knows , he can calculate up to  	for sure as a set of his rational
choices depends only on his knowledge. Also since 2 knows, the set of his ra-
tional strategies is	. Call these sets of strategies sets of players’ lim-
ited rationalizable strategies. Let 
and 
.
Now assume that players know the theory of games. Then each player knows
which strategy combinations are equilibria, based on his limited rationalizable
strategies. In addition assume that players try to coordinate their strategies
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using concept of risk dominance. Because  and , con-
sider the following strategic game that is equivalent to the original game .
Notice that it happens that the game is equivalent to the game . In general,
however, each player would consider a different game each other, depending on
his knowledge of the game and his knowledge of the other player’s knowledge of
the game and so on. Each player might consider that the solution of the game
must be coordinated equilibrium strategy combinations or . This
is justified by the fact that players want to coordinate their strategies from the
structure of the game, and they know the theory of games.
By transforming the game to the game preserving the best-reply structure, we
get the following strategic game ?the unanimity game?.
Let 	be the player 
	’s belief that player 	takes action . When 1 takes
, he gets and when , gets . Thus if 	



is
better than , and if 



 is better than . Now , so is
?????? ??????? ????????
??
A B
A 0, 0 1, ?L
B ?L, 1 M, M
A B
A L, L 0, 0
B 0, 0 M?1, M?1
much more risky than for player 1. Similarly if


, then is bet-
ter than for 2. If 


, then is better than  for 2. Thus again
is much more risky than for player 2. Both players have the same intensity
to avoid risk, and they know this fact. Thus they would choose . The conse-
quence depends on players’ beliefs of the other player’s action. Hereis not de-
termined so far. The determination will be discussed later.
As we expect


as  so that no players think that they can
coordinate their strategies.
4 The General Model
Given		



, 1 can calculate up to
 		
 

because
1 does not know whether 2 receives 1’s 
th massage or not. On the other hand
2 can calculate up to
 		
 

because 2 does not know whether 1 re-
ceives 2’s 	

th message or not. Similarly at 		


2 can calcu-
late up to 
 		
 

for 
and 		

for 
. Thus at
		




or
,
,
, player 1 knows his limited rationalizable
strategies in 
 and 2 knows his limited rationalizable strategies in 


 . In
order to induce 
 , 1 must knows 
 so that 1 thinks that 2’s rationalizable
strategies in
 . Similarly to induce


 , 2 must know 1’s rationalizable strate-
gies in 


 .
Assume that players know the theory of games so that they know which strat-
egy combinations are Nash equilibria. By this assumption we do not mean that
players can take Nash equilibrium strategies and moreover can coordinate their
strategies because we do not assume players’ internal consistent beliefs over
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other player’s actions. We can only say that each player can recognize which are
Nash equilibria.
Given   and  , 1 knows Nash equilibrium  
 . Also given 

 and 

 , 2 knows Nash equilibrium 


 

 . Notice that it is possible that players have considered different
games. This is due to the fact that the game is  is not common knowledge.
Let
	
  		
			


		


That is,is a set of ?pure strategy? Nash equilibrium from the point of view of
1 at 	. Similarly let
	


 

 		
			


		


If	, player	compares these equilibria by considering which equilibrium
is likely to occur. That is, each player	is assumed to decide his optimal strategy
in terms of risk dominance when there are multiple Nash equilibria from the
point of view of 	. According to Harsanyi and Selten ?1988? let 	be
subjective probability distribution over possible Nash equilibrium strategies, and
		be the tracing procedure from the view of point of player	, where	is
the game that player 	thinks possible. Thus let
	
  
	  
	


 

 
	

 

 
Notice that 	is not necessarily unique, nor are both and always the
same.
?????? ??????? ????????
??
Remark : The former represents that it is difficult to choose strategies in a co-
ordination game. The latter indicates that as a result players cannot coordinate
their strategies under the environment where players consider decision-theo-
retically another player’s strategies.
Given. Player 1 would take the dominant strategybecause he
knows that the true state is . Player 2 thinks that the true state is either
or . Thus , . 1 considers that 2’s set of
rational choices is . 2 considers that 1’s set of rational choices is . Thus 1
considers the following game
2 considers
or
Thus
	
	
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A B
A M, M 1, ?L
A B
A M, M 1, ?L
B ?L, 1 0, 0
A B
A 0, 0 1, ?L
B ?L, 1 M, M
where means the strategy combination in the game .
1 has no uncertainty in terms of risk. On the other hand, 2 tries to choose his
strategy by risk comparison. Now  risk dominates in . Con-
sider the level of risks between games. In this case it seems to be trivial because
2 knows that 2 can playsafely inand that 2 knowsrisk dominates
. Thus 2 would play  because 2 does not care whether the game is 
or . Therefore both 1 and 2 choose strategy .
Given . Then 	
, 	
. 1 considers
2 considers
or
Also they choose .
Proposition 1. In the electronic mail game,
?1? when both players do not know the game that they will play, they can coordi-
nate thier strategies at , but not at .
?????? ??????? ????????
??
A B
A 0, 0 1, ?L
B ?L, 1 M, M
A B
A M, M 1, ?L
B ?L, 1 0, 0
A B
A 0, 0 1, ?L
B ?L, 1 M, M
?2? As long as players know at least the game that they will play, they cannot co-
ordinate in general, because the players’ attitude to the risk to take an action deters
them from taking efficient strategies whenever .
Proof. We have shown that the first part holds at and . Notice
and  when the game 	 is common knowledge. For all

, 
	, and  at 

	.
Thus

 
	for . Thus

 
Therefore the players choose strategy  for any states of the nature.
The second part of Proposition 1 means that once the players realize the game
	, they know for sure the difficulty of coordination in 	even if they have suf-
ficient knowledge of the game, so that the fact prevents them from coordinating
their strategies.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have reconsidered Rubinstein’s paradox, and have showed that
his result holds when each player can take actions that are feasible from the point
of view of decision-theoretical foundation. Notice in Proposition 1 we did not tell
how is determined in detail because we know that the value of 	is de-
termined by considering the difference of Nash products in an unanimity game
?Harsanyi and Selten ?1988??.
If we could justify that is uniformly distributed as in example, depending on
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players’ beliefs of the opponent’s actions, we could say that coordination is pos-
sible, but it would be difficult. We leave the problem open. The difficulty of the
coordination comes from the fact that in the game  it is more difficult to coor-
dinate than . It is represented by that the concept of rationalizability does not
reduce set of actions in the game .
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